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On Urbanism in the Early Years of Francoism 
The first reflections on architecture following the Spanish Civil War arose in the 
late 1970s, beginning with the exhibition Arquitecturas para despues de una Guerra 
[Architecture for after a war]. Since then, an extensive bibliography assesses that 
which is known as the "art of the state" and aims to understand the architecture 
favored by the early Franco regime between 1939 and 1949· These studies have con-
firmed that the Nuevo Estado [New state], which is known as the "Fascist alterna-
tive," was capable of generating an ideological response and presenting it as an 
alternative to the culture of the Republic. The regime, however, a bloody coup de-
void of ideology, sought only to justify and theorize a posteriori. This amounted to 
an offering of an alternative mask for that which had been the culture of the 
Republic. Thus, one fact that is 11nanimously accepted by political scientists was not 
taken into account: Francoism consisted of numerous groups (for example, conser-
vatives, monarchists, Fascists, Catholics) that competed with one another and were 
characterized by strong internal differences. Instead of a coherent image of archi-
tecture and urbanism as a reflection of state policy, contradictions were apparent. 
These contradictions include the government's acceptance of a coordinated policy 
among agencies (for example, planning, colonization, reconstruction) working 
independently of those responsible for constructing social housing. 
A Contradictory Political iand Professional Landscape 
. i 
The reflection on architecture and urbanism during the first years of Francoism 
should not focus on architects' monographs, analyses presented by certain organi-
zations, or the fortune of emblematic projects. Rather, this reflection should in-
stead try to understand this reality by identifying contradictions. This is the only 
means to understanding whether or not there was a break between architectural 
approaches prior to the war and those proposed after the war. It is true that many 
professionals decided, since the beginning of the uprising, to support Franco's 
project. However, it should be forgotten that these same ~ctors had developed, up 
to the week prior to the battle, a modern approach to qfchitecture and urbanism 
that was later repudiated. Regardless of the contempor~ry debates about minimal 
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housing, standardization, prefabrication, and land management, they were required, 
within a short period of time, to end the dispute by improvising a formal alterna-
tive option. 
Monarchists, such as Cesar Cort (professor of urbanism at the School of Madrid), 
criticized the liberal city model. They understood this model as representing a city 
in which promoters could act independently of guidelines and regulations imple-
mented in specific areas or zones by use or amount. Among Catholic groups (for 
example, Opus Dei, the Propagandists), some proposed to maintain rationalist 
architecture as the fornial image. Thus, Francoism would be presented to the world 
not as a dictatorial regime, but rather as a peaceful transition between two regimes. 
The latter required a radical change in regard to city management and the policies 
of social housing. Some, such as Francisco de Asfs Cabrero, received their titles im-
mediately after the war. Cabrero, an author, was living near the Trade Unions Build-
ing on the Paseo del Prado. After visiting Italy and seeing Libera's work, Cabrero 
proposed to adopt the metaphysical option at the same time as others, such as Luis 
Moya (teacher at the School of Madrid). He opted for a redefinition of classicism 
ranging from Diocletian's Palace in Spalato (now Split, Croatia) to the projects con-
ceived in the late eighteenth century by Boullee. Victor d'Ors, who had been called 
the architect aesthete of the Palange by Primo de Rivera himself, was incapable 
of projecting a single significant work.' Luis Gutierrez Soto (undoubtedly the 
architect par excellence of the Spanish bourgeoisie) was able, with unspeakable 
eclecticism, to convert a building into a representation of Francoism by including 
"ritual shouts" (that is, laudatory phrases, such as "Franco, Franco, Franco" or 
"Long live Spain") in the facade. Soto was able conceal a functional building behind 
a historicist facade, therefore aiming to successfully produce the "architecture of 
the empire." 
Can Francoist architecture and urbanism be set equal to the architecture and 
urbanism of the Palange? Obviously, this is not the case. Those who, during the 
1950s, were vehemently Falangist and not working for the Ministry of Housing 
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Figure 1. Alberto Acha, Theoretical organization of a district of 
100,000 habitants, I 946 
had been rationalist architects before the war. Those appointed, in 1939, to higher 
positions in the field of urbanism had collaborated with the previous reform pro-
ject in 1934: the suburbs and extension of Madrid commissioned by the socialist 
government. As a result, the architect who designed the Royal Nautical Clubin San 
Sebastian, which is the only example of a Baroque rationalist building (commented 
on by Sigfried Giedion and later by Henry-Russell Hitchcock), abandoned his pro-
fessional practice scarcely three years after finishing the work and dedicated him-
self completely to the politics of the Fascist party Palange Espa:fiola. 
The Palange was a blo<l>dy coup of a class that saw its privileges questioned by a 
Republic that was worri~d about the correct management of its capital. Disparate 
tendencies did not only exist within Francoism, but were also inherent to the 
Palange. It was absurd to speak of a single line of thought. As a result, since its in-
ception, the dissent, confrontations, expulsions, and condemnations that were to 
be ostracized remained constant. If the first national leader of the Palange were to 
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be assassinated by a Republican group after the beginning of the war, the second 
national leader would be sentenced to death by Francm's government a few months 
later. Before the war, several architects supported the Palange, including Alberto 
Acha, Jose Manuel Aizpurua, Jose Luis de Arrese, Manuel Bringas, Jose Fonseca, 
Victor d'Ors, Jose Subirana, Manuel Valdes Larranaga 1nd Luis Felipe Vivanco. 
However, by the end of the conflict, this was no longe~ of any professional rele-
vance for them. 
From the early moments of the Franco victory, the media confused its audiences 
by presenting proposals for fanciful realities that would soon be forgotten. People 
demanded amends for property damaged during the war. In an urgent manner, 
they called upon property owners to construct extensive residential neighborhoods. 
However, nothing was done. At the same time, exhibitions were presented that 
showed housing projects planned for the short-term future. 
At this time, in 1939, the seemingly impossible plan to build housing for 6,ooo 
people in Madrid (blocks with six floors of four flats each for affordable, econom-
ical rents) was announced. Furthermore, in a few months' time, 14,000 licenses for 
construction, repairs, and improvements were to be granted in the capital alone. 
This would provide a time frame within which property owners could modify their 
homes without paying fees. Furthermore, in an attempt to satisfy officials, the 
victors were granted the right to occupy (that is, seize) homes from the conquered. 
The order described this form of occupation as a temporary state, depending on 
whether or not authorization was granted by the mayor. 
Pedro Bidagor and the Debate on Post-Civil War Reconstruction 
Between July 18, 1936, and the final months of 1939, the Franco government faced 
five main issues: (1) definition of criteria for reconstruction policies; (2) substitution 
of the previous social-democratic model of the city with the next urban model 
defined by Berlin or Rome; (3) proposal of housing policies to benefit the bourgeoi-
sie in order to secure their support; (4) construction of new economical housing; 
and (5) enhancement of autarkic policies (that is, to enable internal colonization). 
If reconstruction was the top priority, the situation at the end of the Civil War in 
April 1939, just prior to the invasion of Poland, forced the development of autarkic 
policies, so that reconstruction was understood as an economic and not an architec-
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tural term. In Spain, the reconstruction of an economy characterized by a destroyed 
industry was necessary. The result was an autarkic economy, which was created 
in the belief that the urban and the rural should each generate different types of 
prosperity: big cities were to produce ideology, and rural areas were to support the 
economy. This distinction was developed by Pedro Bidagor (1906-96), who had col-
laborated on a project developed by Secundino Zuazo and Hermann Jansen for the 
expansion of Madrid prior to the war. Bidagor understood the necessity of convert-
ing a rural agrarian economy into an agrarian industrial economy. He accepted, 
in consequence, the Taylorist assumptions defined years earlier. Bigador consid-
ered the function of urban centers, aside from presenting a monumental image, to 
be the creation of ideological wealth. In this manner, two visions of the city were 
defined (that is, the urban option and the rural option), between which there was 
no overlap. When we discuss how the same technicians simultaneously applied 
grandiloquent options in the city and maintained the rationalist knowledge that 
characterized the years of the Republic, the contradiction becomes apparent. As a 
consequence, during a time in which it was necessary to place high priority on in-
vestment (that is, due to the lack of materials for construction), the regime opted to 
postpone social housing reconstruction policies. The later attempts to tackle the 
problem, circa 1949, forced mass migration from rural areas to the large population 
centers as a result of the failure of autarkic policies. This caused the number of peo-
ple living in shantytowns or caves in Madrid in 1943 to make up more than half of 
the population. 
In June 1939, just three months after the end of the Spanish Civil War, the First 
National Assembly of Architects was celebrated. Bidagor and his group laid the 
foundations for the "capital of the empire," the image of the new city, the concept 
of an organic city, industrial zones, the relationship between the city and its envi-
ronment, plans for urban expansion, and even a vague "Plan for National Recon-
struction." Bidagor not only faced immediate problems, but also a bizarre situa-
tion in which ideas were presented in many distinct sectors, each more absurd 
than the one before. The Bishop of Madrid, for example, proposed dividing the 
I 
city along the existing parishes in the diocese. One prominent Falangist, the pres-
ident of the Commission tb Promote the Culture of the Palange, recommended 
"changing the appearance of Madrid" by "burning Madrid on all four sides while 
keeping firefighters in some of the most important buildings.'" Similar to another 
intellectual from the same party, he demonstrated his dislike of the city, referring 
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to it as "Ground Madrid." Madrid, one must remember, resisted until the fin'al 
moments of the war; its fall meant its own demise. Following this line of "logic," 
the Germanophile Minister of External Affairs, Ramon Serrano Sufi.er, propos~d 
punishing Madrid for having been the bastion of the Republic by moving the c~p­
ital to Seville. In a few months' time, all types of exthneous ideas were formed 
regarding Madrid's potential futures: some claimed tha~ it would regain its position 
as a European capital, others highlighted the necessity of reconstructing its idio-
syncrasies and not reconstructing homes without changing customs. It is interest-
ing, when analyzing these ideas, to try to understand the birth of a new option and 
its genealogy. 
During the years of the Spanish Civil War, a group of architects who clearly 
opposed the Republic managed to infiltrate the anarcho-syndicalist union CNT 
(Confederaci6n Nacional del Trabajo) and organize a work team with the objective 
to lay the foundations for the future of Madrid. They did so without specifying that 
the city that they were working on was the same one that they understood to be the 
capital of Francoist Spain. The group, which was directed by the previously cited 
Pedro Bidagor, worked on the issue for at least two years. When they finalized the 
content, the Francoist government faced the problem of how to derail the social 
democratic city. Thus, they reverted to the work coordinated by Bidagor. He pre-
sented his ideas on the new urban reality at the previously mentioned First National 
Assembly of Architects. In this context, architects, engineers, and administrators 
presented their criteria of a new city. They theorized their opinions about Die neue 
Stadt [The New city]) the text recently published by Gottfried Feder, and its diffu-
sion through Luis Perez Minguez, who had studied at the Technische Hochschule 
Berlin [Technical School of Berlin] under the direction of Hermann] ansen. 
Only twenty days after the end of the war, the recently constituted Junta de 
Reconstrucci6n de Madrid [Assembly for the reconstruction of Madrid] was made 
responsible for the urbanization project of the capital and its suburbs. Bidagor took 
control of the proposal. After defining Madrid's position as the "capital of the 
empire,'' he proposed both an internal reform and intervention in what, before the 
war, had been a city where, according to certain criteria, there was "social peace." 
As a reflection of Albert Speer's proposals for Berlin, a monumental avenue with 
a monumental complex was defined for Madrid instead of housing for the upper, 
middle, and working classes. Gaspar Blein, who collaborated with Bidagor during 
the war and was later an architect on the city council, theorized about the "idiosyn-
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Figure 2. Plan for the extension of the Castellana and the surrounding area in Madrid, I946 
crasy" of Spanish cities. According to Blein, these should be organized primarily 
to fulfill a mission, subordinating their role to destiny that comes from God so as 
to constitute a single group, understood as a human being, as an organic whole. 
Blein was in favor of the radioconcentric growth of th.e nineteenth century.He 
noted that, since the role of Madrid was to be representative, the city should be 
involved in establishing a central political district. Later( others publicly discussed 
the ideas developed by Bidagor's CNT group.3 
During those years, Bidagor would play a key role, as he was capable of absorb-
ing and diluting the calls of the Technical Services of the Palange and preventing 
the transformation of the institution into an armed branch of something aiming 
to be a Spanish Arbeitsfront. At that time, a plot was hatched among different 
agencies responsible for reconstruction in Spain to expand their influence within 
the Direcci6n General de Regiones Devastadas [General Direction ol Devastated 
Regions, DGRD], Direcci6n General de Arquitectura [General Direction of Archi-
tecture, DGA] or the Instituto Nacional de Colonizaci6n [National Institute of 
Colonization, INC]. The confusion regarding housing policies began in 1938, when 
the National Union Project was constructed. The aim of the project was not only 
to participate in the reconstruction, but also to create "protected housing" that 
would meet hygienic, technical, and economic requirements. Furthermore, it aimed 
to focus on different types of benefits, those who could use and construct them 
as weU as how to conduct the necessary land expropriation. In December 1939 the 
directors of the Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda [National Institute of Housing, 
INV] and the Obra Sindical del Hogar [Worker Union of the Home, OSH] clashed 
over three premises defined by Bidagor. As a result, the state decided to approve 
three premises: (r) the construction of social housing in a destroyed Spain could 
only have an industrial solution; (z) the necessity of moving laborers' housing set-
tlements to the urban periphery, thus removing them from land speculation; and 
(3) the approval of a National Plan within which the actions of government agen-
cies would be scheduled. The INV and OSH, who were entirely excluded from this 
process, would act at the margin of the guidelines defined by Bidagor, despite very 
limited budget allocations. Those familiar with the housing policies of the first ten 
years of Francoism should be able to confirm that official statistics reveal a reduc-
tion in the number of houses constructed. The housing constructed during the im-
mediate postwar period consisted mostly of housing for party officials or laborers 
who were members of the party. 
In a Spain that had been destroyed by the war and which lacked industrial 
resources, the handling of autarkic policies was a central problem. Contrary to the 
"art of the state," which failed on account of the lack of guidelines and overlapping 
proposals, the reconstruction (that is, the reconstruction of the agrarian economy, 
decisive in the years of autarky) was defined and coordinated by Bidagor. During 
the war, in 19 3 8, the proposed guidelines were debated as part of the greater dis-
pute over reconstruction at a conference of architects in Burgos. During the same 
meeting, the participating architects went beyond a rhetorical conversation about 
imprecise subjects. For example, the claim that "constructing 'homes' in front of 
buildings defined the house as 'the center of spiritual expansion and the framework 
for educating the family"' was discussed in the context of a debate about housing. 4 
It became evident that it was necessary to define a reconstruction policy. Pedro 
Muguruza, an architect of some fame prior to the war, initially assumed this task. 
Muguruza had contemporized architecture with his modern style. It was removed 
from the academies, but completely oblivious to the concerns that had character-
ized the pioneers during the early 1930s. 
Researchers studying the role of German ambassadors during the war have high-
lighted the political significance of the dissemination of German technical books 
among Spanish professionals. This occurred at a time when Germany began pre-
paring an exhibition about the architecture of the Third Reich, which was inaugu-
rated in 1941 by Albert Speer at the National Library of Madrid. The two texts 
primarily disseminated include the previously men~ioned Die neue Stadt by Gottfried 
Feder (1939) and Der Osten [The East] by Julius Schl11te-Frohlinde and Walter Kratz, 
which was edited by the Arbeitsfront and published in 1938. German politicians 
were aware of the importance that internal colonialism could have for the govern-
ment of Franco. Not only did the texts propose a reflection about popular archi-
tecture in East Prussia, they also proposed a response to the National Socialist 
ambition to transfer the "Aryan" population to that area ("Sie verloren die Heimat, 
um das Vaterland zu gewinnen" [They lost their homeland to win their father-
land]).5 The Nazis debated !what should be characteristic of a colonized city of 
100,000 inhabitants and analhed which types of housing should be used. If, during 
I 
those years, Spanish architects followed the example of German architecture, 
the references to Italian architecture were made from a poetic perspective. Intel-
lectuals, such as Eugenio Montes or Rafael Sanchez Mazas, were valued in the 
way that Italian architects interpreted ancient Rome. Therefore, the first refer-
! 
ences to internal colonialism appeared in published news of the bonifica of Agro 
Pontino, detailing the experiences made in Sabaudia, Pontinia, Pomezia, Aprilia, 
and Littoria. 
In 1939 Pedro Muguruza presented his "Ideas generales sobre el Plan Nacional 
de Ordenaci6n y Reconstrucci6n" [General ideas about1the national plan for plan-
ning and reconstruction] at the First National Assemblt of Architects, a reflection 
I 
on the unpublished "Ten-year Plan for Reconstruction."6 Here, complementing the 
guidelines for the Service to Devastated Regions, he defined precisely the infra-
structure that was to be constructed (for example, military or civilian headquarters, 
courts, barracks, town halls) for the management of the government. 
Some years later, he presented to Eduardo Torroja the necessity for technical 
systematization of what would be understood (well differentiated from what was 
initially proposed) as a national revival plan. For Muguruza, to reconstruct did not 
mean to rebuild homes, but rather to establish the state apparatus, complementing 
the idea of economic reconstruction. To understand the reality of that plan, it is 
useful to study official public calls for tenders published in those early years in the 
Boletfn Injormativo of the DGA. 
The Institute of Credit for the Reconstruction, DGRD, and DGA were the three 
legs upon which the reconstruction was established. For this reason, the credit 
amounts granted by official agencies focused both on enhancing and rebuilding in 
the short term and on agriculture as an alternative to a destroyed industry (that is, 
building administrative buildings, whether barracks, government buildings, or gov-
ernment offices). The selection criteria for projects in rural centers were not based 
on the degree of destruction, but on the role the respective centers should play. Fol-
lowing the suggestions of agricultural engineers who collaborated on the policy, the 
relocation of some centers a short distance away from their original locations was 
proposed. This was considered a way to integrate a new population into the project 
on a large scale, which amounted to the configuration of a new economic space. 
A Complex Implementation 
Since Bidagor's role was not limited to laying the foundations for urban growth, 
knowing how to transmit standards (for example, oversight, e\Taluation, and 
interpretation) was just as important as being able to plan them. Bidagor also put 
126 
Figure 3. General Direction of devastated regions, Plan for the "New Belchite," 1940 
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Figure 4. General Direction of 
devastated regions, Plan for 
the "New Belchite," adminis-
trative and religious centers, 
1940 
together a team of architect colleagues (for example, Blein, Perez-Minguez, or 
Garcia de Pablos), administrators Qose Gascon and Marin) and industrial engineers 
(Abelardo Martinez de Lamadrid), each facing a common problem from a different 
perspective. By defining criteria, Bidagor was able to integrate, if only for a few 
years, municipal policies into the work of organizations like the INC and the 
DGRD. By using Muguruza's illness as a pretext, he was even able to integrate them 
into the efforts of the DGA. The DGA accepted Bidagor's standards, which char-
acterized urban planning, without discussion. If the competitions organized by the 
DGA for the construction of buildings for the administration were directed at free-
lance professionals, the policies marked by Bidagor would be developed by official 
architects. In other words, if the freelance professionals lacked formal guidelines, 
forcing an architecture that they understood as what was desired by the Nuevo 
Estado, the latter knew at all times how to act and adapt to the policies imposed by 
the Bidagor group. 
The DGRD and the INC faced a triple issue. First, they had to decide where to 
act, understanding the villages in terms of the new agricultural areas. Second, they 
had to shape the new settlements and their collective spaces. Third, they would 
have to show them the houses for farmers. Those technicians who, after the war, 
formed part of the DGRD or INC had mostly received their degrees before the war 
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Figure 5. General Direction 
of devastated regions, 
Construction of the village 
"New Sesefia" in the 
province of Toledo, r 940 
and had a discrete professional profile. The failure of their form of planning only 
has two possible explanations: either they were always eclectic in their plapning 
or they did not see the contradiction between their previous activities and the 
reflection about the vernacular (that is, the study of popular culture and the nor-
malization of tradition) imposed by the DGRD or INC. Unlike those in the city, 
who adopted the premises of a historicist pastiche, the guidelines about rural archi-
tecture were distinct. Several competitions were organized that related to rural 
housing for different regions. Ignasi de Sola-Morales highlighted the characteristics 
of housing during his time, emphasizing the continuity from the architecture be-
fore the war. 
In National Socialist Germany, the work of Paul Schultze-Naumburg, Kultttr-
arbeiten [Cultivation work], was conceived as a catalogue of picturesqueness that 
identified with the eternal or Seele [soul] and not with the ephemeral or Geist 
[spirit]. In Italy, the study of popular architecture was considered - as Giuseppe 
Pagano and Guarniero Daniel did7 - by taking the vernacular as a guideline for 
the development of modern architecture, just as was proposed before 1936 by the 
Grup d'Arquitectes i Tecnics Catalans per a la Realitzaci6 de l'Arquitectura Con-
temporania [Group of Architects and Technicians for the Realization of Contem-
porary Architecture, GATCPAC] and by Leopoldo Torres Balbas from Madrid.8 
The population was faced with two options for rural projects in Francoist Spain. 
Therefore, its valuation was biased. As a result of the application of inaccurate 
facades, more or less locally, to generic rural architecture projects through pro-
grams designed for stringent requirements, an emphasis was placed on the vaiLe 
and survival of certain ornamental elements (for example, fences, windows, doors, 
facade colors). This emphasis aimed to make people forget (by way of intended 
picturesqueness) the extent to which such projects shm~ld be understood from tpe 
perspective of the rational logic that prevailed before ~he war. 
The Republic had begun implementing an ambitiou~ National Plan of Hydraulic 
I 
Works (that is, after the 1929 crisis, the state focused, to the detriment of municipal 
performance, on strengthening hydraulic works, road networks, and the electrifi-
cation of railways), which involved enhancing internal colonialism and occupying 
the unpopulated margins of the resulting water basins. In 1939 agricultural policy 
developed two different plans that prioritized, from the beginning, the first over 
the second. The food needs of the urban areas conditioned the situation of agricul-
tural communities (I insist that the locations were determined by agricultural engi-
neers) in relation to large population centers. Once the locations of the agricul-
tural centers were determined, ground plans had to be developed. In this regard, 
German and Italian experiences with similar situations were determining. 
In the early 1920s, Werner Hegemann published Nordic projects in new rural 
population centers in Stadtebau. Some of these projects, in the following decade, 
would serve as a reference for other designs in Germany. The designs by Sverre 
Pedersen, which later inspired Herbert Rimpl, are one example. These images 
would reach architects in the Devastated Regions as well as those at the Institute 
of Colonization. It is true that the subject of rural centers had been raised multiple 
times in Spain since the beginning of the century. However, in the late 1930s, the 
model of the closed city, which was impossible to develop given the defined perim-
eter, was adopted as a solution for the colonization of early Francoism. As a result, 
the concept of the "organic city" was reclaimed. After defining the size and design 
of these rural centers, the question was how to deal with the organization and de-
sign of urban centers and Spanish architects looked to the Italian experience of 
bonifica agraria. This is why the program created plazas in urban centers, located 
next to the church and town hall, which was often also the location of party head-
quarters, facade, and notary, which were all seen as a pastiche that had little or noth-
ing in common with the rationality of settler homes. 
Until the late 1940s, that system survived. The break toward modernity came 
when the failure of the autarkic P~olicies resulted in the massive abandonment of 
the country by rural populations as they moved to large cities. As a consequence, if 
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Figure 6. Triptych of the Spanish pavilion for the Interbau 1957 Berlin, front. 
until the moment the construction of homes in large city centers had scarcely been 
the subject of reflection, in few years shanty towns (that is, the forced residence of 
a dispossessed population) occupied land coveted by those seeking to undertake 
large real estate projects in Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, and Valencia. Moreover, the 
end of World War II forced new architectural references. In Spain, concerns regard-
ing this issue would be reflected in works published by Miguel Fisac in the very of-
ficial Boletin of the Direcci6n General de Arquitectura. Fisac's works ridiculed his-
toricist architecture and presented European concerns about the new bias that 
architecture was forced to assume. Fisac, who had received his architecture degree 
shortly before, would go on to become one of the brightest professionals in the fol-
lowing decades. 
If the formal dreams of those who dared to propose an architecture of the state 
were soon forgotten (taken into account realized projects), the urban project in large 
population centers also gave way to the pressure of real estate and landholders. The 
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Figure 7. Triptych of the Spanish pavilion for the Interbau r 9 57 Berlin, reverse. 
government was the worst enemy of the plan conceived by Bidagor, relinquishing 
the proposed "imperial city" to the interests of the real estate sector. Had the plan 
been made public in 1941, it would have been approved as a law in 1946, when (after 
the real estate sector had hoarded the land, increasing its value), expropriation be-
came impossible. That early period of Francoist urbanism ended as quickly as the 
dream of Nuevo Estado architecture ended, because, when early Francoism was 
stripped of its idealist mask, financial capital took control of planning after sabotag-
ing the plan, thus ruining what was the architecture of the soft pencil. That which 
was proposed during the first five years of Francoism was reflected only in the mag-
azines of the period; the brutality of those who ended the urban vision of the Re-
public (that is, of a city understood in terms of social peace) gave way to absurdity. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
In conclusion, I would like to touch on several aspects that any research should take 
into account: In the first place, to reflect on whether Francoism was capable of 
generating an ideology, in which case it created an urban-architectural proposal 
consistent with the global policy developed in those years, or whether, on the con-
trary, because it was only a military coup whose only ideology was to change the 
political situation that had developed in the social-democratic Republic, it was nec-
essary to invent self-styled architectural proposals linked to the heroic past, while 
necessity forced an urban response based on urban productivity criteria. Even this 
last statement needs to be questioned to differentiate between what urbanism was 
in large population centers and the solutions provided to carry out autarkic policies. 
The third aspect is to assume that Francoism was monolithic over nearly forty years 
or, on the contrary, to assume that international events (that is, changes in eco-
nomic conditions) forced the consideration of at least three major phases: (1) that 
since the end of the Civil War in 1939, the Vatican and the US signed the first 
diplomatic agreements with the regime; (2) when agrarian policy failed, the major 
population centers experienced a mass emigration that disrupted urban structures; 
finally, (3) the awakening that began in l 960 in Spain with economic development. 
A last question would be to determine and evaluate the extent to which early Fran-
coism took up the proposals made during the years of the Republic. This would 
mean that the phrase coined by Ernst Bloch would take on new meaning: "The 
pages that follow will speak of all kinds of ancient and surprising phenomena. The 
deception has been huge - and how it was done - not only do you need to look 
at the hands of the rascals, but also to see what is hidden in them, mainly to see if 
they have stolen what they had or, if at one time, that which is now dirty was in 
better hands."9 
Translation ~Alice Drive0 revised~ Neele Reimann-Philipp 
Notes 
See Victor D'Ors, "Confesi6n de un arquitecto." 
2 "Para cambiar la fisonomia de MADRID," 8. 
Gaspar Blein, "Organismos," 84-9 3. 
4 Raimundo Fernandez Cuesta, "Discurso de clausura," 22. 
1 3 3 
5 Hermann Hesse, "Einmal Deutsch, itnmer Deutsch," 38. 
6 Archivo de la Real Academia de San Fernando. Fonda Pedro Muguruza. 
7 See Giuseppe Pagano and Guarniero Daniel, Architettura. rura!e ita!iana. 
8 Carlos Sambricio, "La critica arquitect6nica y Leopoldo Torres Balbas," 407-28. 
9 Ernst Bloch, "On the Original History of the Third Reich," 21. ' 
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